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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Khamla Inthapanya contends the district court abused its discretion by allowing one of
the officers to give improper opinion testimony without conducting half of the analysis required
by controlling precedent. The State’s arguments in response are not persuasive. The relevant
case law reveals this issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal, the district court’s decision to
admit the opinion testimony was inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, and the State
failed, under the proper standard, to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As
such, this Court should vacate the verdict and judgment of conviction and remand this case for
further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Inthapanya’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it overruled Mr. Inthapanya’s objection to
the officer’s improper opinion testimony without conducting the analysis required by controlling
precedent.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Overruled Mr. Inthapanya’s Objection To The
Officer’s Improper Opinion Testimony Without Conducting The Analysis Required By
Controlling Precedent

A.

Court Of Appeals’ Precedent Makes It Clear That Mr. Inthapanya’s Relevance Objection
Was Sufficient To Preserve His Argument Under I.R.E. 702 For Appeal
Below, trial counsel objected to the improper expert opinion testimony on the grounds of

relevance. (Tr., p.592, Ls.10-13.) Accordingly, in his opening brief, Mr. Inthapanya expressly
argued that, “if the opinion is not beyond the common sense, experience, or education of the
average juror, that opinion is not relevant to the trial. (See Tr., p.592, Ls.10-11.)” (App. Br., p.6
(emphasis added).) Nevertheless, the State maintains that he “makes no attempt, however, to
show how such an objection preserve his appellate argument.” (Resp. Br., p.5.) Since the
State’s response blatantly ignores the actual argument Mr. Inthapanya made, this Court should
reject the State’s frivolous response in that regard.
This Court should also reject the State’s preservation argument because it is frivolous on
its merits. As the Court of Appeals has recently explained, I.R.E. 702 defines when an expert
opinion is relevant, and therefore, admissible: “once the witness is qualified as an expert, the
trial court must determine whether the expert’s opinion testimony will assist the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence. I.R.E. 702 . . . . This condition goes primarily to relevance.”
State v. Caliz-Bautista, 162 Idaho 833, 835-36 (Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added). “One aspect
of relevancy,” the Court of Appeals continued, “is whether the expert testimony is sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case such that the testimony will aid the jury in resolving a factual
dispute.” Id. Therefore, Mr. Inthapanya’s objection on the grounds of relevance was sufficient
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to preserve his argument – that the officer’s testimony was not relevant under I.R.E. 702 because
it did not address an issue beyond the average juror’s ken – for appeal.
The district court actually appears to have understood that this was the case, as it engaged
in conducted half of the analysis required under I.R.E. 702 in response to Mr. Inthapanya’s
relevance objection. (See Tr., p.592, L.23 - p.593, L.3.) In fact, the fact that the district court
actually decided the issue under the auspices of I.R.E. 702 means the district court’s decision
itself was sufficient to preserve Mr. Inthapanya’s argument for appeal even if his objection itself
was not. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (explaining that an exception to the
preservation rule “has been applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or decided by the
trial court. . . . Since this issue was directly addressed by the trial court below, we will decide this
issue on appeal.”) (emphasis added).
For either reason, this Court should reject the State’s frivolous preservation argument.

B.

The District Court’s Decision To Admit The Officer’s Opinion Was Inconsistent With
The Applicable Legal Standard
As with its preservation argument, the State’s responses on the merits of the issue on

appeal are contrary to the applicable precedent in several respects. First, its contention that the
district court does not need to articulate its analysis under the applicable test when ruling on
whether evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence (Resp. Br., p.6) has been rejected by
Court of Appeals. E.g., State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 151 (Ct. App. 2011). In Gomez, there
was a question of whether the district court needed to articulate its analysis under I.R.E. 404(b)
in regard to whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the prior conduct the State sought
to present at trial actually occurred. Id. The Court of Appeals held that, “if that question is
squarely at issue,” then the district court is “required to make a specific articulation” of its
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analysis in that regard. Id. (explaining the decision in Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 239
(Ct. App. 2010)); accord State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 215 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v.
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 53 (2009)); see also State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 762 (2015)
(holding that the district court’s failure to conduct the analysis required by Grist was an abuse of
the district court’s discretion).
The State tries to distinguish the reasoning in those cases on the basis that they dealt with
a pretrial motions, while the objection in this case occurred during trial. (Resp. Br., p.6.)
However, the State does not cite any opinions regarding in-trial decisions to support its
argument; rather, it only cites to opinions which were reviewing decisions to impose a sentence
or deny a motion for leniency. (See Resp. Br., p.6.) Of the two, the line addressing pretrial
decisions regarding the admission of evidence is more like the issue in this case, since the
question at the heart of both is whether evidence is properly admitted under the Rules of
Evidence. As such, the line of cases Mr. Inthapanya has cited should control the analysis in this
case, meaning the district court’s failure to articulate its rationale when the question was squarely
presented to it was an abuse of its discretion.
In fact, one of the cases the State cites in support of its argument – State v. Newman –
actually supports Mr. Inthapanya’s argument. In Newman, the Idaho Supreme Court explained
that it is preferable for the district court to actually articulate the rationales for its decision
because, without that articulation, the appellate court may not have a sufficient record to review
the sentencing decision. State v. Newman, 124 Idaho 415, 418-19 (1993). That was, in fact, the
case in Newman, and so the Supreme Court vacated the sentence based on the district court’s
failure to articulate its reasoning and remanded the case so the district court could actually
conduct the proper analysis. Id.; compare State v. Ojeda, 119 Idaho 862, 867 (Ct. App. 1991)
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(finding the record sufficient to review the sentencing decision despite the fact that the district
court did not articulate its reasoning, and so affirming the decision to deny the motion for
leniency at issue in that case).
That lack of an adequate records is, in fact, the reason why the district court is required to
articulate its rationales in the admission-of-evidence context. When deciding whether certain
evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the district court will be required to make
determinations of fact or weigh credibly of conflicting assertions. See Parmer, 147 Idaho at 215.
As a result, the record’s mere recitation of the arguments and final decision will not adequately
reveal the district court’s unspoken rationales for appellate review. E.g., Orellana-Castro, 158
Idaho at 762 (explaining that there was no record of what facts the district court considered to
constitute the common scheme or plan that would justify the admission of the evidence in that
case). As a result, the district court needs to articulate its rationale when the question of
admissibly of certain evidence is directly before it so that the appellate court can adequately
evaluate those rationales under the proper standard.

Gomez, 151 Idaho at 151; compare

Newman, 124 Idaho at 418-19.
As such, the rule from the Orellana-Castro and Gomez line of cases should guide the
analysis in this case. Since the question of relevancy under I.R.E. 702 was directly before the
district court, its failure to articulate its analysis on the question squarely before it constituted an
abuse of its discretion. On that basis alone, this Court should vacate the district court’s decision
in this case. See Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762.
Second, the State misunderstands Mr. Inthapanya’s argument that, had the district court
actually conducted the second half of the requisite test, it would not have allowed the officer’s
opinion testimony in. Mr. Inthapanya argued that the problem in this case was with allowing the
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officer to testify that it was his opinion that Mr. Khenyarath got all the heroin in question
specifically from Mr. Inthapanya (i.e., testifying that Mr. Inthapanya was guilty of the offense
charged) because that was a question which the average juror was capable of answering on his or
her own. (App. Br., pp.6-8.) However, the State tries to twist that argument into an evaluation
of whether the average juror would know about the “niceties of heroin trafficking.” (Resp.
Br., pp.6-7.) That response noticeably ignores the fact that Mr. Inthapanya actually explained in
his Appellant’s Brief that the officer likely could testify about those aspects of heroin trafficking
– that individual drug dealers might package drugs in a particular manner, that heroin has a
particular price range in a particular area, etc. – provided that the district court actually found
that information to be beyond the jury’s ken. (App. Br., pp.7-8 (though Mr. Inthapanya noted
that, because the district court did not actually conduct that part of the analysis, there was
actually no decision to that effect in this record).)
Ultimately, though, the State’s strawman in that regard is irrelevant to the actual issue on
appeal – regardless of whether the officer could testify about the “niceties” of heroin trafficking,
he still cannot testify that, because such facts are present in this case, it is his opinion that this
defendant was the source of the drugs purchased in this case. The average juror is absolutely
capable of deciding what weight to attach to the various pieces of evidence presented in the
testimony, including the officer’s testimony about the niceties of heroin trafficking, in
determining whether the State proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (R., pp.169-70 (the
district court instructing the jurors to do precisely that with respect to all the evidence in the case
and specifically repeating that instruction in regard to expert testimony).)
As such, the average juror absolutely could, without need of the officer’s expert opinion,
decide whether Mr. Inthapanya was the source of all the heroin bought in this case by
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considering both the officer’s explanation about the “niceties of heroin trafficking” and the
contrary evidence that Mr. Khenyarath’s normal source was low, such that Mr. Khenyarath, as
was his custom, was considering turning to a different source of lower-quality heroin to make the
December 29, 2015, deal, and that Mr. Khenyarath subsequently apologized to the undercover
officer for actually selling him a lower quality of product during the December 29 deal. (See
App. Br., pp.1-2 (detailing the evidence about Mr. Khenyarath looking to an alternative source
for the December 29 deal.) As such, the district court erred by allowing the officer to testify that
it was his opinion that all the drugs came from a single source (Mr. Inthapanya) rather than
multiple sources because the weighing of the evidence in that respect was within the average
jurors’ ken.

C.

Applying The Proper Standard, The State Failed To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
That This Error Did Not Contribute To The Verdict Actually Rendered
Like its other arguments, the State misrepresents the issue actually on appeal in regard to

its assertion that this error was harmless. The State contends that, because trafficking in its base
form only requires delivery of two grams, the verdict would have been the same absent error.
(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) However, the trafficking statute includes various enhancements based on the
amount of heroin trafficked. I.C. § 37-2732B. The grand jury below specifically indicted
Mr. Inthapanya, at the prosecutor’s request, under subsection (a)(6)(C), which enhances the
potential sentence to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum term if twenty-eight grams are
possessed. (R., pp.11-13) When a charge involves such enhancements, the facts underlying that
enhancement must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. State v. McLeskey, 138 Idaho
691, 698 (2003) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). Therefore, if the error
affected the jury’s decision regarding the enhancement, the error is not harmless. Chapman v.
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California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding the question under the harmless error doctrine is
whether the verdict actually rendered by this jury was surely unattirbutible to the error); State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 206, 221 (2010) (acknowledging various articulations of the harmlessness
standard and specifically adopting the Chapman articulation).
The State used the December 29 sales to help prove that it had met the twenty-eight-gram
threshold for the enhancment. (See Tr., p.800, L.1 - p.801, L.4.) As such, there is a reasonable
possibility that, despite the evidence suggesting Mr. Khenyarath had gone to a different source
for the heroin he sold the undercover officer on December 29, the jurors deferred to the officer’s
opinion in specifically finding that enhancing fact in the special verdict form. (See R., pp.206-07
(the verdict form).) Thus, there is a reasonable possibility that this error contributed to the
verdict this jury actually rendered, and as such, was not harmless.
In fact, the State’s argument – that this Court should find that a hypothetical jury would
have convicted Mr. Inthapanya of a lesser form of trafficking – does not acurately reflect the
proper standard for assessing harmlessness. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. To say that an error
did not contribute to the verdict does not mean the appellate court has to say the jury needed to
be unaware of the erroneous evidence; rather, it must be able to say the error was not important
within the whole fabric of the case. Yates v. Evitts, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part
on other grounds. That is not a subjective inquiry into how the appellate court thinks the jurors
would ultimately decide the case. See id. Rather, it is an objective evaluation of whether there is
a reasonable possibility a reasonable juror could have considered that evidence (or lack of
evidence) to be an important factor in the decision this jury made. See id.; Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993). More important, though, is the fact this standard does not operate
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as a zero-sum game –while other evidence might also be important, that does not, ipso facto,
mean the erroneous evidence was not. See id.
The Idaho Supreme Court actually demonstrated how that analysis is supposed to work in
State v. Thomas. When the Court of Appeals ruled on that case, it concluded that the erroneous
suppression of certain defense evidence was harmless because, in the Court of Appeals’ opinion,
the improperly-omitted testimony was less significant and less believable than other evidence in
the record, and so, it held the verdict would have bene the same absent the error. State v.
Thomas, Not Reported in P.3d, 2014 WL 1266316, **4-8 (Ct. App. 2014). However, the Idaho
Supreme Court granted review and reached precisely the opposite conclusion on the harmless
error question. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ___, 342 P.3d 628, 631-32 (2015). It explained
that a reasonable juror could have believed the improperly-omitted testimony, which meant the
error was not harmless. Id. It could not say that the erroneous omission of that evidence was not
significant within the fabric of that case, regardless of how significant the other evidence
considered by the Court of Appeals might have been. See id.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated this point in State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 378, ___,
413 P.3d 778, 782 (2018). In that case, it rejected the State’s argument – that the erroneous
exclusion of defense evidence regarding the per se theory of DUI was harmless because “Austin
still would have been convicted under the impairment theory of DUI” – because there was no
indication on which theory the jury in that case had actually reached its verdict. Id. As in
Thomas, the State in Austin had not proved the erroneously-admitted evidence was objectively
not significant within the fabric of the case actually presented to the jury, which meant that error
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
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The State’s argument in this case makes the same mistake the Court of Appeals did in
Thomas – it is based on this Court determining that the erroneously-admitted opinion testimony
was not significant based on the belief that other evidence presented was significant. (See Resp.
Br., pp.8-9.) In other words, the State has asked this Court to weigh the evidence itself and
resolve this case based on how it thinks a hypothetical jury would ultimately decide this case.
That, the United States Supreme Court has expressly held, is improper under Chapman.1
Sullivan, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993). In fact, as the Sullivan Court explained, adopting such a
perspective would amount to an independent violation of the constitutional right a jury trial:
“The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s
action” which means “to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered—no matter

1

In making its harmless error argument, the State pointed to an articulation of the harmless error
standard in State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44 (2017) – that the question is simply whether
the error would have been the same absent the error. (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, the State’s
argument takes the Montgomery articulation out of context because that articulation is rooted in
Chapman. Specifically, Montgomery quoted part of the explanation of the harmless error
standard from State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013). Montgomery, 163 Idaho at 44. The
full recitation in Almaraz to which the Montgomery Court was referring states:
‘Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a constitutional violation
occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a reversal is
necessitated unless the State proves ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict.’’ Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 . . .
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 . . . ). Put another way, did the State prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same if [the
witness’s] testimony had not been erroneously admitted into evidence.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 598. As such, Almaraz and Montgomery must be understood within the
context of Chapman – that, if the error was objectively significant within the overall fabric, the
appellate court cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict would have been the same
without that evidence. See id.; Montgomery, 163 Idaho at 44. Therefore, despite referencing
Montgomery, the State’s actual argument still fails to conform with the proper standard for
harmlessness.
11

how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial
guarantee.” Id.
Rather, under the proper standard, the officer’s improper opinion testimony was
objectively significant within the fabric of the case regardless of whether other evidence was also
significant. As such, the State has failed to carry its actual burden to show this error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which means this Court should vacate that erroneous
decision.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Inthapanya respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment of
conviction in this case and remand it for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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